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Dispute Resolution and Arbitration in Britain:
Current Trends and Prospects
by P.B. Beaumont*t
I. INTRODUCTION
T his discussion of dispute resolution and arbitration in Britain is
divided into three sections. The first provides a brief historical per-
spective on the position and role of arbitration in the traditional system
of industrial relations in Britain. The second addresses the arbitral trends
during the 1970's, following the establishment of the Advisory Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Service and the Central Arbitration Committee. The
concluding section focuses on the likely future of arbitration in the Brit-
ish system of industrial relations.
II. THE HISTORICAL POSITION OF ARBITRATION
When considering the historical position of arbitration in the British
system of industrial relations before 1970, it should be emphasised that
compulsory arbitration has been a relatively rare phenomenon, confined
largely to wartime years.1 During the First World War, the Munitions of
War Acts provided for legally binding arbitration where disputes could
not be settled by the parties. The conditions of Employment and Na-
tional Arbitration Order No. 1305 of 1940, contained even more extensive
provisions, which were utilized throughout World War II. One should not
overestimate the impact of these compulsory arbitration arrangements.
Order 1305, for example, did not prevent strikes from occurring and there
were relatively few attempts to enforce the law against striking.$ Of the
4,510 cases reported under Order 1305, only 2,092 were referred to the
Nation Arbitration Tribunal; and as many as 1,745 cases were either
* Department of Social and Economic Research, University of Glasgow.
t I am grateful to officers of the ACAS Regional Office in Scotland for the provision of
data and comments on the nature of the analysis undertaken here. The comments of my
academic colleagues Laurie Hunter and Andrew Thomson are also gratefully acknowledged.
Hepple, Compulsory Arbitration in Great Britain in COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARmSON 83, 109 (J. Loewenberg ed. 1976).
2 Id.
3 A. FLANDERS, TRADE UNIONS 97 (1968).
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withdrawn or settled following conciliation by officers of the Ministry of
Labour.'
Order 1305 remained in force until August, 1951, when it was re-
placed by the Industrial Disputes Order No. 1376." While the latter Order
did not prohibit industrial action, it continued to provide for compulsory
arbitration arrangements until February, 1959. Between 1951 and 1959
there were 1,277 awards made by the Industrial Disputes Tribunal under
the terms of this Order.6 The most detailed assessment of the history of
compulsory arbitration in British industrial relations concluded that "the
heydey of compulsory arbitration has passed, and is unlikely to return
except in time of national emergency."'7 This conclusion is less certain if
viewed in light of recent requests for the introduction of compulsory arbi-
tration as a substitute for the right to strike by certain groups of "essen-
tial service" employees in the public sector.' These requests followed siza-
ble public sector strikes and appear to have gone relatively unheeded in
policymaking circles.
In contrast, Britain has a relatively long history of using voluntary
arbitration to settle the industrial disputes. The formal basis for employ-
ing such a tool was the Industrial Courts Act of 1919.' This Act created a
permanent arbitration tribunal, the Industrial Court, which arbitrated
disputes at the reuest of the concerned parties. It also permitted the Min-
ister of Labour to refer any matter to an ad hoc Court of Inquiry,10 and
provided for the appointment of ad hoc arbitrators and boards of arbitra-
tion." A voluntary arbitration award by the Industrial Court (which
changed its name to the Industrial Arbitration Board in 1971),12 was not
enforceable in ordinary courts."3 In practice, however, the participants
usually complied with the award and once the award had been acted
upon, it became an implied term in the employment contracts of the indi-
viduals concerned. There were some situations in which the jurisdiction
of the Industrial Court extended beyond that of a voluntary arbitral
body. This was where an administrative or legal sanction existed as a
"back-up" to the arbitration award; 4 one such example was the Fair
Id. at 100 (1968).
6 See Hepple, supra note 1, at 87.
6 See Hepple, supra note 1, at 100.
7 See Hepple, supra note 1, at 109.
See generally THE ECONOMIST Nov. 19, 1977 at 19.
9 See Hepple, supra note 1, at 85.
10 See Hepple, supra note 1, at 85.
" See Hepple, supra note 1, at 85.
2 See Hepple, supra note 1, at 85.
11 See Hepple, supra note 1, at 85.
14 For a discussion of its role in these situations see, K.W. WEDDERBURN & P.L. DAVIES,
EMPLOYMENT GRIEVANCES AND DISPUTES PROCEDURES IN BRITAIN 192-210 (1969).
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Wages Resolution of 1946, which will be discussed in section III.
Between the First and Second World Wars, from 1920 to 1938, 1,669
arbitral awards were made by the Industrial Court, with an additional 315
awards made either by single arbitrators or by ad hoc boards of arbitra-
tion appointed by the Minister of Labour.1 5 These awards were dispro-
portionately concentrated in certain industries: engineering, shipbuilding,
railroads and other forms of transportation, the civil service, and public
utilities. Together these awards accounted for 791 of 963 awards made by
the Industrial Court between 1921 and 1932.16 It should be noted that the
non-industrial civil service was removed from the jurisdiction of the In-
dustrial Court when a separate Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal was es-
tablished in 1936.17 While this tribunal issued 385 awards during the pe-
riod between 1936-1959,18 there has been a subsequent decline in the
number of references to arbitration. This change is alleged to be the re-
sult of policies of wage restraint, the most vigorously enforced restraints
in the public sector, and has compromised the independence of the arbi-
tral body.19 A number of other groups of public sector employees, such as
the railroads, have long had independent arbitral bodies.
An indication of the potential use of arbitration in the British system
of industrial relations was provided by a study conducted by the Ministry
of Labour in the mid-1950's. 20 This study of 152 industries, excluding
those with statutory wage fixing arrangements or with the central Gov-
erment as the employer, revealed that fewer than one-half (75) had pro-
cedural agreements which stipulated the referral of unresolved disputes
to arbitration;21 the remaining 24 included agreements that disputes
might be so referred.22 Appendix A indicates the extent to which such
potential usage was realized by showing the number of arbitration awards
and conciliation settlements made under the auspicies of the Ministry of
Labour between 1939 and 1959. During this period, compulsory arbitra-
tion was used more frequently than voluntary arbitration. However, the
more important finding is that the number of conciliation settlements
typically exceeded the total number of arbitrtation awards in any given
year. In the traditional, voluntarist system of British industrial relations,
conciliation has always been the preferred form of third-party interven-
"A. FLANDERS, supra note 3, at 94.
" Id. at 95.
17 Id. at 95.
'8 These figures are taken from Frankel, Arbitration in the British Civil Service, 38
PuB. AD. 200 (1960).
19 See generally Beaumont, The Adverse Effect on Incomes Policy on the Acceptabil-
ity and Use of Arbitration in the British Civil Service, 54 Pun. AD. 1 (1976).
:0 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TRADES UNION CONGRESS 239 (1954) (verified by author).
1 A. FLANDERS, supra note 3, at 100.
22 Id.
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tion to arbitration; the majority of arbitration awards have always ema-
nated from a failure to produce a settlement at the prior conciliation
stage.2
A useful indication of the extent to which arbitration has been used
to settle disputes, with particular attention given to wage issues, is pro-
vided by the Ministry of Labour annual estimates of the proportion of
total weekly wage increases brought about by the various available meth-
ods of settlement. The relevant figures for the years between 1945 and
1966 are presented in Appendix B. These figures indicate that during the
period from 1946 to 1955, less than nine percent of wage increases re-
sulted from arbitration awards. In the next decade, 1956 to 1965, the pro-
portion dropped to three percent. It is evident upon analysis of Appendi-
ces A and B that, both in practice and in numerical terms, arbitration
played a- relatively small role in the traditional system of industrial rela-
tions in Britain.
It is useful to briefly note some of the major issues of discussion sur-
rounding the traditional operation of arbitration arrangements in Britain.
The distinction between dispute of "interests" and those of "rights,"
which has been so important in the United States, has been of relatively
little practical interest in Britain. The first relevant issue is whether arbi-
trators should provide reasoned arbitral awards. Traditional British prac-
tice has been not to give such reasons, primarily because this could exac-
erbate the existing conflict between the parties in dispute.2' On a related
point, there has been considerable discussion as to whether an arbitrator
adopts a "judicial" or "political" attitude toward the dispute in question.
Does the arbitrator attempt to determine who is right and award accord-
ingly, or does he make an award which reflects the relative bargaining
strengths of the two parties in dispute?2 5 Finally, much consideration has
been given to the question of whether Government-appointed arbitrators
can, or should, give an independent award during a time when Govern-
ment policy explicitly seeks to limit the size of wage increases negotiated
and awarded within the framework of industrial relations.26 These diffi-
culties stemmed from existing Department of Employment (formerly the
Ministry of Labour) practices and played an important role in the crea-
tion of the ACAS, in 1974.27
2 Hunter, Economic Issues in Conciliation and Arbitration, 15 BRrr. J. OF INDUS. REL.
238-39 (1977).
24 See, e.g., Hepple, super note 1, at 102.
215 See, e.g., Lockwood, Arbitration and Industrial Conflict, 6 BRIT. J. oF Soc. 336
(1955).
" Beaumont, supra note 19, at 206.
'7 Hunter, supra note 23, at 228.
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III. ARBITRATION TRENDS IN THE 1970's
The establishment of the ACAS in 1974,28 and its subsequent codifi-
cation in the Employment Protection Act of 1975, was very important.
For the first time since 1896,29 the provision of conciliation and arbitra-
tion facilities was removed from a Government department and placed in
a publicly-financed organization under the control of an independent,
non-governmental council.30 The ACAS council consists of a full-time
chairman, appointed by the Secretary of State for Employemnt, and nine
part-time members. 1 Of the part-time council members, three are nomi-
nated by the central trade union federation (TUC), 2 three by the central
employers federation (CBI),33 and three are independents drawn from the
academic sector.3 4 The specific purposes of the ACAS were: "to provide
conciliation and mediation as a means of avoiding and resolving disputes,
to make facilities available for arbitration, to provide advisory services to
industry on industrial relations and related matters and to undertake
investigations as a means of promoting the improvement and extension of
collective bargaining."3 5 The ACAS provision of arbitration facilities is
provided by the terms of Section 3 of the 1975 Employment Protection
Act.38
Unlike the conciliation procedure, the ACAS appoints arbitrators
rather than use its own employees. Both parties to the dispute must con-
sent to arbitration, a procedure which is used only as a last resort. Re-
298 Kessler, The Prevention and Settlement of Collective Labor Disputes in the United
Kingdom, 11 INDus. REL. J. 17 (1980).
29 Id.
30 Id.
21 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
31 Id. at 18.
38 (1) Where a trade dispute exists or is apprehended the Service may, at the re-
quest of one or more parties to the dispute and with the consent of all the parties
to the dispute, refer all or any of the matters to which the dispute relates for
settlement to the arbitration of:
(a) one or more persons appointed by the service for that purpose (not be-
ing an officer or servant of the service); or
(b) the-Central Arbitration Committee constituted under Section 10 below
(2) In exercising its functions under subsection (1) above, the Service shall con-
sider the likelihood of the dispute being settled by conciliation and where
there exist appropriate agreed procedures for negotiation or the settlement of
disputes, shall not refer a matter for settlement to arbitration under that
subsection unless those procedures have been used and have failed to result
in a settlement or unless, in the opinion of the service, there is a special rea-
son which justifies arbitration under that subsection as an alternative to
those procedures.
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quests for arbitration typically arise as a result of a failure to reach a
settlement at the prior conciliation stage, although, in some cases, dis-
putes are referred directly to arbitration under the terms of the parties'
particular procedure agreements. The ACAS regional office in Scotland,
accounting for some 10 percent of the total arbitration workload of the
service, estimates that some two-thirds of their arbitration cases have
previously attempted conciliation, the remaining one-third arising out of
direct requests for arbitration. Awards arising from voluntary arbitration
are not legally binding, but since arbitration can proceed only with the
consent of all parties to the dispute, it is presumed that the award will be
accepted; in practice, this invariably seems to be the case.
3 7
The size of the ACAS arbitration workload is strongly influenced by
the extent to which settlements are reached at the prior conciliation
stage. The latest available figures for 1980, indicate that settlement, or
progress towards a settlement, was achieved in 77 percent of the disputes
conciliated in that year; 8 the figure for the previous year was 78 per-
cent.39 Because of this relatively high percentage of conciliation settle-
ments, it is not surprising that references to conciliation far outnumber
those to arbitration. In 1980, the ACAS received 2,091 requests for collec-
tive conciliation as compared to 291 cases which went to arbitration. By
contrast in 1979, of the 2,667 requests received, 363 cases went to arbitra-
tion.4 These collective conciliation figures are distinguished from concili-
ations of individual employee complaints alleging infringement of speci-
fied employment rights, such as unfair dismissal. The number of
arbitration cases handled by the ACAS is substantially greater than the
number which were heard by the Department of Employment. In 1973,
the last full year during which the arbitration function was carried out by
the Department of Employment, the number of cases heard was only 54.41
Since the ACAS has assumed this function, the number of arbitration
cases heard has increased.42 Generally, these cases have been heard by
single arbitrators and not full arbitral boards. For example, of the 291
arbitration awards made in 1980, 237 of them were made by single arbi-
trators.4 3 The number of conciliation cases in any given year varies signif-
icantly and is influenced by economic factors such as unemployment and
decreases in real wages.44 Such factors undoubtedly influence the arbitra-
tion workload since the majority of arbitration cases arise out of prior
11 KESSLER, supra note 13B, at 21.
36 ACAS ANNUAL REPORT 1980 14 (1981) (verified by author).
I !d.
40 Id. at 14 and 23.
41 Kessler, supra note 28, at 21.
42 Concannon, The Growth of Arbitration Work in ACAS, 9 INDus. REL. J. (1978).
13 ACAS ANNUAL REPORT 1980 supra note 38, at 107.
11 Hunter, supra note 23.
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conciliation requests.
The primary causes of disputes referred to arbitration include sub-
sidiary pay issues such as grading, holiday pay and bonus payments, as
well as issues regarding dismissals and discpiline. 45 The 1980 ACAS An-
nual Report noted that most of those disputes referred to arbitration in
1979 involved local issues arising in individual companies or plants; con-
versely, in 1980, the Service was responsible for referring over twenty na-
tional pay issues to arbitration, including seven major cases. Annual pay
settlements for approximately 1.3 million workers, nearly six percent of
those employed, predominantly in the public sector, were determined in
this manner.46
There has been much discussion in U.S. industrial relations literature
concerning the possibility of a "narcotic effect" occurring under compul-
sory arbitration arrangements.47 The essence of the "narcotic effect" is
that dispute resolution procedures, ". .. often tend to the overused; they
may become too accessible and as a consequence, the responsibility and
problem solving virtues of constructive negotiations are lost. Dispute set-
tlement procedures can become habit-forming and negotiations become
only a ritual."48 Similar concerns have been expressed about the opera-
tion of voluntary arbitration arrangements in Britain:
[the dispute procedure] may provide for arbitration as a final stage in the
procedure. Such a provision might be particularly helpful if used to re-
solve disputes at [sic] local level on issues which are not regarded by the
parties as appropriate to go beyond more than one external stage of pro-
cedure. However, it must be recognised that an excessive reliance on
arbitration can weaken the effectiveness of the negotiating procedures
in resolving disputes. 9
In order to provide a preliminary examination of the possible existence of
such an effect in Britain, Appendix C shows the industrial distribution of
arbitration cases heard by the ACAS between 1976 and 1980.
Correlation coefficients indicate that these industry groups which ac-
counted for a relatively high or low proportion of the ACAS arbitration
workload in 1980, for example, were the same as those which accounted
for a high or low proportion in previous years. The "percentage of users"
figures are admittedly not the ideal measure for testing this effect; a more
appropriate basis of measurement would be the percentage of impasses or
45 ACAS ANNUAL REPORT 1980, supra note 38, at 23.
41 Id. at 24.
47 See, e.g., Wheeler, Compulsory Arbitration: A Narcotic Effect?, 14 INDUS. REL. 119
(1975).
" Kochan & Baderschneider, Dependence on Impasse Procedures: Police and
Firefighters in New York State, 31 INDUS. AND LAB' REL. REV. 431 (1978).
40 TUC, GOOD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A GUIDE FOR NEGOTIATIONS 15 (1971).
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disputes in a given industry, within a limited period of time, that went to
arbitration. The central question is whether union-management disputes
in those industries which use arbitration extensively are disproportion-
ately concentrated among a relatively small number of individual union-
management relationships, or, whether these disputes are a more wide-
spread phenomenon within each of the industries. The former pattern of
usage would be more consistent with the traditional notion of a narcotic
effect which is an individual relationship, rather than an industry-based
phenomenon. No nationwide figures are available on the number and
characteristics of individual employment establishments that have been
repeated users of arbitration through 1980. However, figures provided by
the ACAS regional office, in Scotland, do provide some evidence to sup-
port the finding that a disproportionate number of arbitration cases have
involved a relatively small number of employment establishments. During
the 30-month period extending to mid-1980, the ACAS Scottish regional
office handled 107 arbitration cases,5 0 of which 24.3 percent were in the
food, drink, and tobacco industries,51 and 14 percent in mechanical engi-
neering.5 2 Moreover, 43 percent of these 107 cases had come from only 17
employment establishments that had been to arbitration more than once
in this period of time. These figures indicate nearly three arbitration
cases per establishment in less than three years.5 Only 21.8 percent of
the employment establishments that had used the ACAS arbitration ser-
vices in Scotland accounted for 43 percent of the arbitration caseload
within a 30-month period of time.5'
The other body which has been responsible for British arbitration in
the 1970's is the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC), created by sec-
tion 10 of the Employment Protection Act of 1975.55 The CAC replaced
the Industrial Arbitration Board. It consists of a chairman, several dep-
uty chairmen, and members who are experienced union and employer
representatives. The CAC had two basic functions during the 1970's:
those inherited from the Industrial Arbitration Board, and new functions
based on various provisions of the 1975 Employment Protection Act and
the Equal Pay Act of 1970. 57 Furthermore, the CAC also inherited the
responsibility for ensuring compliance with the terms of the Fair Wages
Resolution of 1946, as passed by the House of Commons." The Resolu-
" Information provided through author's personal communications.
Information provided through author's personal communications.
Information provided through author's personal communications.
'3 Information provided through author's personal communications.
Information provided through author's personal communications.
'5 Kessler, supra note 28, at 25.
Id.
7 Id. at 26.
58 For a review of the operation of this clause see, Beaumont, The Use of Fairways
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tion states that a union has a unilateral right to bring an employer before
the CAC if it believes that an employer is not paying "fair wages."59 Fair-
ness is defined by comparing rates, hours, and conditions established in
the relevant industry and district by negotiations or arbitration, with the
general level observed by comparable employers in the industry.60 Such
fair wage clauses have also been incorporated into a number of statutes
over which the CAC has jurisdiction; these statutes include the Civil Avi-
ation Act of 1949,1 the Films Act of 1960,62 and the Independent Broad-
casting Act of 1973.3
The new functions of the CAC differ from the traditional British vol-
untary arbitration process in that one party has a unilateral right to seek
arbitration, with the resulting awards being legally enforceable as implied
terms of the contract of employment. The CAC was empowered, under
the terms of the Equal Pay Act of 1970, to amend any collective agree-
ments or pay structures that were discriminatory in nature, but most of
its new functions are derived from various provisions of the Employment
Protection Act of 1975." Under Schedule 11 of this Act, a union could
bring a claim before the CAC to ensure the observance of recognized
terms and conditions or, if there were no recognized terms and condi-
tions, a claim could seek compliance with a general level of terms and
conditions. 5 Under sections 19 through 21 of the Employment Protection
Act of 1975, a union could file a charge with the CAC stating that an
employer had failed to disclose information necessary for collective bar-
gaining purposes to that union's representatives.6 If the CAC found the
claim well-founded, a declaration would be made specifying the informa-
tion which should be disclosed. If there were still no disclosure, the union
would have the right to take the employer to unilateral binding arbitra-
tion by the CAC on the terms and conditions of employment.6 7 Finally,
under section 16 of the Act, an independent trade union could complain
to the CAC that an employer was not observing an ACAS recommenda-
tion to recognize that union. The union again would have the right to
take the employer to unilateral binding arbitration by the CAC on the
Clauses in Government Contracts in Britain, 28 LAB. L. J. 148 (1977).
8 K.W. WEDDERBURN & P.L. DAVIES, supra note 14, at 193.
60 Id. at 194.
61 Civil Aviation Act, 1949, 12, 13,14, Geo. 4, ch. 67.
02 Films Act, 8, 7 Eliz. 2 ch. 57 (1960).
63 Independent Broadcasting Act, 1973 ch. 19.
64 Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 § 3; Employment Protect Act, 1975, ch. 71, pts. I, III.
65 For a review of the CAC role in this regard see generally, Beaumont, Arbitration the
Extension of Terms in Britain, 34 ARBITRATION JOURNAL 32 (1979).
66 The general duty is imposed by Employment Protection Act, 1975, c. 71, § 18.
67 For a review of the CAC role in this regard see, A. MARSH & R. HUSSEY, DISCLOSURE
TO UNIONS-How THE LAW IS WORKING (1979) (verified by author).
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terms and conditions of employment."' Appendix D indicates the CAC's
arbitration workload for the period between 1977 and 1980.
There has been a dramatic decline in the workload of the CAC in
1979 and 1980; the total number of references between 1979 and 1980
(1,067) was slightly more than one-half the number between 1977 and
1978 (2,095). The basic reason for this dramatic decline was the absence
of a formal income policy or policy of wage restraint. An artificially high
number of claims under Schedule 11 of the Employment Protection Act
of 1975 and the Fair Wages Resolution of 1946 were put forward in 1977
and 1978 in an attempt to circumvent the constraints of a wage policy. By
the end of this policy implementation, the number of claims decreased
considerably. This workload decline will undoubtedly continue, if not ac-
tually worsen, in the future. In 1980, the Conservative government passed
the Employment Act which repealed Schedule 11 and section 16, concern-
ing union recognition, of the Employment Protection Act of 1975." This
vulnerability to legislative change has caused the CAC to reconsider its
future role.
IV. THE FUTURE POSITION OF ARBITRATION
The CAC's obvious concern for its declining workload has encouraged
it to consider upgrading its role as the standing body for voluntary arbi-
tration in Britain. Its 1979 Annual Report states:
The value of arbitration in the process of dispute resolution is acknowl-
edged but not utilized to the extent that would be expected in a modern
industrial society. The various modes of arbitration are not fully under-
stood, for example the problem solving approach applied both by the
CAC and arbitrators in general which removes many of the risks inherent
in the reference of a major issue to.arbitration. Further, it permits an
extension of the arbitral process by giving opportunity for the parties to
present their cases for assessment prior to further negotiation or for the
parties to benefit by awards which exploit both sides of the effort-reward
bargain. Arbitration has rather more to offer than just an award which
bisects claim and offer. The role of arbitration is not as established as in
some other countries. Support for the constitutional approach to the res-
olution of disputes has declined as less emphasis has been placed upon
procedures. This decline can, in part, by reversed by the establishment of
one organisation as the focal point for all industrial arbitration. This na-
tional arbitration service, together with the conciliation services of
ACAS, would serve as the basis of the machinery which the Government
a8 For a review of the CAC role in this regard see, Doyle, A Substitute for Collective
Bargaining? The Central Arbitration Committee's Approach to Section 16 of the Employ-
ment Protection Act 1975, INDus. L.J. (Sept. 1980) (verified by author).
11 Employment Protection Act.
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makes available to parties to resolve the issues between them without
recourse to costly and damaging action.70
It remains to be seen whether this focus will result in an augmented
CAC role, although, at the present time, it seems unlikely. Predictably,
this proposal has not found a great deal of favor within the ACAS:
There are differences between the procedure for arbitration provided di-
rectly by ACAS and that provided by the CAC. When arbitration is ar-
ranged directly by ACAS, acceptance of arbitration is often secured by
allowing the parties to nominate or select their side members and to be
consulted about the choice of a chairman. This can make the parties
more ready to accept arbitration and can sometimes provide a channel of
communication with the arbitrator through side members. It can also be
a consideration that the award from an ACAS arbitration board is pri-
vate to the parties. In contrast, the CAC draws its side members from a
list of 56 appointees, 28 for each side, and is required to publish its
awards.7 '1
The ACAS insisted that there were considerable advantages to maintain-
ing the present flexibility of arbitration arrangements due to procedural
differences between it and the CAC. The likely future for arbitration in
British industrial relations is that it will continue to have a relatively
small role numerically, but, within certain sectors of industry, it will have
considerable importance as a dispute settlement technique. The ACAS
Annual Report for 1980 clearly expressed the hope that arbitration will
be used more frequently in the public sector.72 The increasing use of arbi-
tration seems to be a likely development, and a desirable one, in view of
the current unrest concerning the general state of public sector industiral
relations in Britain.
73
70 CAC ANNUAL REPORT 1979 25 (1980).
71 ACAS ANNUAL REPORT 1980 26 (1981).
72 ACAS ANNUAL REPORT 1980 25-6 (1981).
7' For a recent union statement, see generally, TUC HEALTH SERVICES COMMITTEE, IM-
PROVING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE 65-77 (verified by author)
(1981).
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Appendix A
ARBITRATION AWARDS AND CONCILIATION SETTLEMENTS
UNDER THE
MINISTRY OF LABOUR - 1939-1959*
National
Year Industrial Arbitration Single Civil Conciliation
Court Tribunal or Arbitrators, Service Settlements
Industrial Boards of Arbitra-
Disputes Arbitration tion
Tribunal etc. Tribunal
1939 25 - 10 11 100
1940 38 50 26 6 300
1941 71 120 43 3 550
1942 39 121 62 5 390
1943 41 195 95 7 350
1944 62 188 58 6 240
1945 46 142 34 4 220
1946 39 91 37 1 200
1947 43 132 29 2 227
1948 76 154 34 9 362
1949 48 188 51 16 403
1950 43 201 27 21 299
1951 68 222 47 36 330
1952 71 215 31 33 320
1953 64 178 31 33 353
1954 59 185 23 32 255
1955 40 128 16 34 243
1956 46 151 24 16 276
1957 40 113 16 15 217
1958 36 131 27 20 190
1959 46 88 27 17 173
* Taken from A. FLANDERS, TRADE UNIONS 101 (1968).
Vol. 14:323
1982 ARBITRATION IN BRITAIN 335
Appendix B
AMOUNTS AND METHODS OF SETTLEMENT OF WAGE
INCREASES
1945 - 1966***
Year Total Number Percentage Attributed to
Amount of
Secured Workers Voluntary Sliding Statutory Arbitration
in Affected Negoti- Scales bodies and
Weekly in ations Mediation
Wage Millions*
Increases
__ _ _ in Em _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1945t
1946t
1947t
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1.8
2.9
1.7
1.9
1.1
2.0
6.6
4.5
2.4
3.5
5.1
6.6
5.3
3.5
1.3
4.3
4.1
5.2
5.1
5.0
6.1
4.5
7.3
8.0
5.0
7.8
5.2
7.4
12.3
11.5
9.0
10.1
11.9
12.7
12.3
11.2
4.7
11.1
7.9
12.7
10.3
9.2
10.8
8.6
* Of about seventeen million wage -earners, roughly thirteen million are
employed under collective agreements (with two million covered by
sliding-scale agreements) and another four million under statutory
regulations.
t Particulars relating to employees in government establishments and
to shop assistants were first introduced in 1948, so that 1945 to 1947
are not strictly comparable with subsequent years.
336 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. Vol. 14:323
** Less than one per cent.
* Taken from A. FLANDERS, TRADE UNIONS, 112 (1968).
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Appendix C
Cases Referred to Arbitration
Mediation and Investigation by Industry Group, 1976-1980*
Industry
Agriculture, forestry + fishing
Mining and quarrying
Food, drink and tobacco
Coal and petroleum products
Chemicals and allied industries
Metal manufacture
Mechanical engineering
Instrument engineering
Electrical engineering
Shipbuilding + marine
engineering
Vehicles
Metal goods not elsewhere
specified
Textiles
Leather, leather goods + fur
Clothing and- footwear
Bricks, pottery, glass, cement,
etc.
Timber, furniture, etc.
Paper, printing and publishing
Other manufacturing
Construction
Gas, electricity and water
Transport and communication
Distributive trades
Insurance, banking and business
services
Professional + scientific services
Miscellaneous services
Public administration + defence
Total
Percentage of Cases
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
0.6
0.3
14.9
0.6
6.2
5.6
6.5'
0.3
5.0
0.6
17.4
1.8
5.2
5.2
7.1
0.3
3.4
- 0.3 0.3
1.0 1.5 -
16.0 17.0 12.8
3.3 1.5 1.8
3.6 5.1 5.5
7.8 8.4 3.8
16.5 11.9 6.5
2.9 - 0.3
2.9 5.1 3.8
2.2 3.7 1.0 0.8 0.9
10.2 10.1 8.6 3.8 5.9
5.6 5.8 4.0
2.6 3.5 1.5
0.2' - -
0.2 0.5 0.6
4.0 4.6 3.8
0.2 1.0 1.8
1.2 2.8 2.3
3.1 2.5 3.8
0.7 1.0 0.9
- 2.0 6.3
5.2 6.3 9.9
3.2 3.5 2.8
0.2 2.3 2.8
6.9 3.8 8.6
1.7 2.5 5.5
1.4 2.5 3.8
323 327 421 395 322
* Taken from Annual Reports of ACAS 1976-1980
1982
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